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PHP Decode
eval(gzinflate(base64_decode('5Vptc9pItv7sVOU/9KhcA3iN5Ewys7uO7ZQshNEEJEYScVzjLCugMZqApJXE..
Decoded Output download
?><?php
/*
-Purpose: looking for malcious code, injection code, shell and backdoor
*/
?>
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd">
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
<meta http-equiv="Content-Language" content="en-us">
<title>WebShell Scanner</title>
</head>
<body body bgcolor=black >
<font color=white size=3>
<p>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</p>
<p><b>WebShell Scanner</b></p>
<p><b>Traces of malicious code, code injections, shell & backdoor</b></p>
<p><b>re-coding by</b> : <b>INSICO</b></p>
<p><b>Greatz </b>: <b>r13y5h4</b> & all member of <b>IndonesianCoder & Codenesia</b></p>
<p>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</p>
<p>
<?php
function curPageURL() {
$pageURL = 'http';
if ($_SERVER["HTTPS"] == "on") {$pageURL .= "s";}
$pageURL .= "://";
if ($_SERVER["SERVER_PORT"] != "80") {
$pageURL .= $_SERVER["SERVER_NAME"].":".$_SERVER["SERVER_PORT"].$_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"];
} else {
$pageURL .= $_SERVER["SERVER_NAME"].$_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"];
}
return $pageURL;
}
?>
<?php
// SET MAXIMUM EXECUTION TIME TO UNLIMITED (0) BECAUSE THE SCRIPT CAN TAKE A WHILE.
// YOU COULD USE A MORE CONSERVATIVE TIME LIMIT SUCH AS 1 HOUR (3600 SECONDS), JUST IN CASE.
// THESE HAVE NO EFFECT IF YOU RUN PHP IN "SAFE MODE" (SAFE MODE IS USUALLY UNDESIRABLE ANYWAY).
ini_set('max_execution_time', '0');
ini_set('set_time_limit', '0');
// --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
// UTILITY FUNCTIONS.
// OUTPUT TEXT IN SPECIFIED COLOR, CLEANING IT WITH HTMLENTITIES().
function CleanColorText($text, $color)
{
$outputcolor = 'white';
$color = trim($color);
if(preg_match('/^(red|blue|green|white)$/i', $color))
$outputcolor = $color;
return '<span style="color:' . $outputcolor . ';">' . htmlentities($text, ENT_QUOTES) . '</span>';
}
// --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
// THIS FUNCTION RECURSIVELY FINDS FILES AND PROCESSES THEM THROUGH THE SPECIFIED CALLBACK FUNCTION.
// DIFFERENT TYPES OF FILES NEED TO BE HANDLED BY DIFFERENT CALLBACK FUNCTIONS.
function find_files($path, $pattern, $callback)
{
// CHANGE BACKSLASHES TO FORWARD, WHICH IS OK IN PHP, EVEN IN WINDOWS.
// REMOVE ANY TRAILING SLASHES, THEN ADD EXACTLY ONE.
$path = rtrim(str_replace("\", "/", $path), '/') . '/';
if(!is_readable($path))
{
echo "Warning: Unable to open and enter directory " . CleanColorText($path, 'blue') .
". Check its owner/group permissions.<br>";
return;
}
$dir = dir($path);
$entries = array();
while(($entry = $dir->read()) !== FALSE)
$entries[] = $entry;
$dir->close();
foreach($entries as $entry)
{
$fullname = $path . $entry;
if(($entry !== '.') && ($entry !== '..') && is_dir($fullname))
find_files($fullname, $pattern, $callback);
else
if(is_file($fullname) && preg_match($pattern, $entry))
call_user_func($callback, $fullname);
}
}
// --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
// CALLBACK FUNCTIONS.
// CALLBACK FUNCTION TO LOOK FOR MALICIOUS CODE - YOU COULD ADD ANY OTHER MALICIOUS CODE SNIPPETS YOU KNOW OF.
function maliciouscodesnippets($filename)
{
if(!is_readable($filename))
{
echo "Warning: Unable to read " . CleanColorText($filename, 'blue') .
". Check it manually and check its access permissions.<br>";
return;
}
$file = file_get_contents($filename); //READ THE FILE
// PRINTING EVERY FILENAME GENERATES A LOT OF OUTPUT.
//echo CleanColorText($filename, 'green') . " is being examined.<br>";
// TEXT FILES WILL BE SEARCHED FOR THESE SNIPPETS OF SUSPICIOUS TEXT.
// THESE ARE REGULAR EXPRESSIONS WITH THE REQUIRED /DELIMITERS/ AND WITH SPECIAL CHARACTERS ESCAPED.
// /i AT THE END MEANS CASE INSENSITIVE.
$SuspiciousSnippets = array
(
// POTENTIALLY SUSPICIOUS PHP CODE
'/edoced_46esab/i',
'/passthru *\(/i',
'/shell_exec *\(/i',
'/document\.write *\(unescape *\(/i',
// THESE CAN GIVE MANY FALSE POSITIVES WHEN CHECKING WORDPRESS AND OTHER CMS.
// NONETHELESS, THEY CAN BE IMPORTANT TO FIND, ESPECIALLY BASE64_DECODE.
'/system *\(/i',
'/`.+`/', // BACKTICK OPERATOR INVOKES SYSTEM FUNCTIONS, SAME AS system()
// '/phpinfo *\(/i',
// '/chmod *\(/i',
// '/mkdir *\(/i',
// '/fopen *\(/i',
// '/fclose *\(/i',
// '/readfile *\(/i',
// SUSPICIOUS NAMES. SOME HACKERS SIGN THEIR SCRIPTS. MANY NAMES COULD GO HERE,
// HERE IS A GENERIC EXAMPLE. YOU CAN FILL IN WHATEVER NAMES YOU WANT.
'/hacked by /i',
// OTHER SUSPICIOUS TEXT STRINGS
'/web[\s-]*shell/i', // TO FIND BACKDOOR WEB SHELL SCRIPTS.
'/c99/i', // THE NAMES OF TWO POPULAR WEB SHELLS.
'/r57/i',
// YOU COULD ADD IN THE SPACE BELOW SOME REGULAR EXPRESSIONS TO MATCH THE NAMES OF MALICIOUS DOMAINS
// AND IP ADDRESSES MENTIONED IN YOUR GOOGLE SAFEBROWSING DIAGNOSTIC REPORT. SOME EXAMPLES:
'/gumblar\.cn/i',
'/martuz\.cn/i',
'/beladen\.net/i',
'/gooqle/i', // NOTE THIS HAS A Q IN IT.
// THESE 2 ARE THE WORDPRESS CODE INJECTION IN FRONT OF EVERY INDEX.PHP AND SOME OTHERS
'/_analist/i',
'/anaiytics/i' // THE LAST ENTRY IN THE LIST MUST HAVE NO COMMA AFTER IT.
);
foreach($SuspiciousSnippets as $i)
{
// STRPOS/STRIPOS WERE A LITTLE FASTER BUT LESS FLEXIBLE
if(preg_match($i, $file))
echo CleanColorText($filename, 'blue') . ' MATCHES REGEX: ' . CleanColorText($i, 'red') . '<br>';
}
" - check it manually for malicious redirects.<br>";
/*
// THIS FINDS ALL JAVASCRIPT CODE. IF ENABLED, IT WILL GIVE *MANY* FALSE POSITIVES IN MOST WEBSITES.
if($p = stripos($file, "<script "))
echo CleanColorText($filename, 'blue') . ' contains SCRIPT:<br>' .
CleanColorText(substr($file, $p, 100), 'red') . '<br><br>';
*/
/*
// THIS FINDS ALL IFRAMES. IF ENABLED, IT CAN GIVE MANY FALSE POSITIVES IN SOME WEBSITES.
if($p = stripos($file, "<iframe "))
echo CleanColorText($filename, 'blue') . ' contains IFRAME:<br>' .
CleanColorText(substr($file, $p, 100), 'red') . '<br><br>';
*/
}
// CALLBACK FUNCTION TO REPORT PHARMA LINK HACKS.
function pharma($filename)
{
echo CleanColorText($filename, 'blue') . " is most likely a " . CleanColorText('pharma hack', 'red') . ".<br>";
}
// CALLBACK FUNCTION TO REPORT FILES WHOSE NAMES ARE SUSPICIOUS.
function badnames($filename)
{
echo CleanColorText($filename, 'blue') . " is a " . CleanColorText('suspicious file name', 'red') . ".<br>";
}
// --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
// SET UP THE SEARCH CRITERIA.
// SEARCHES WILL BE DONE IN THIS DIRECTORY AND ALL DIRS INSIDE IT.
// './' MEANS CURRENT DIRECTORY, WHERE THIS SCRIPT IS NOW.
// THUS, TO SEARCH EVERYTHING INSIDE PUBLIC_HTML, THAT'S WHERE THIS FILE SHOULD BE PUT.
// TO SEARCH OUTSIDE PUBLIC_HTML, OR TO SEARCH A FOLDER OTHER THAN WHERE THIS SCRIPT IS STORED,
// CHANGE THIS TO THE FULL PATHNAME, SUCH AS /home/userid/ OR /home/userid/public_html/somefolder/
// USE FORWARD SLASHES FOR PATH. WINDOWS EXAMPLE: C:/wamp/apache2/htdocs/test/
$StartPath = './';
// ENTRIES IN THE FOLLOWING 3 ARRAYS ARE REGULAR EXPRESSIONS, WHICH IS THE REASON FOR THE /DELIMITERS/.
// FILES WHOSE NAMES MATCH THESE REGEXES WILL HAVE THEIR TEXT SEARCHED FOR MALICIOUS CODE.
$FiletypesToSearch = array
(
'/\.htaccess$/i',
'/\.php[45]?$/i',
'/\.html?$/i',
'/\.aspx?$/i',
'/\.inc$/i',
'/\.cfm$/i',
'/\.js$/i',
'/\.css$/i'
);
// FILES OR FOLDERS WITH THESE STRINGS IN THEIR *NAMES* WILL BE REPORTED AS SUSPICIOUS.
$SuspiciousFileAndPathNames = array
(
// '/root/i',
// '/kit/i',
'/c99/i',
'/r57/i',
'/gifimg/i'
);
// FILENAMES RELATED TO WORDPRESS PHARMA HACK, USING THE NAMING CONVENTIONS
// DESCRIBED AT http://www.pearsonified.com/2010/04/wordpress-pharma-hack.php
// FILES MATCHING THESE NAMES WILL BE REPORTED AS POSSIBLE PHARMA HACK FILES.
$PharmaFilenames = array
(
'/^\..*(cache|bak|old)\.php/i', // HIDDEN FILES WITH PSEUDO-EXTENSIONS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE FILENAME
'/^db-.*\.php/i',
// PERMIT THE STANDARD WORDPRESS FILES THAT START WITH CLASS-, BUT FLAG ALL OTHERS AS SUSPICIOUS.
// THE (?!) IS CALLED A NEGATIVE LOOKAHEAD ASSERTION. IT MEANS "NOT FOLLOWED BY..."
'/^class-(?!snoopy|smtp|feed|pop3|IXR|phpmailer|json|simplepie|phpass|http|oembed|ftp-pure|wp-filesystem-ssh2|wp-filesystem-ftpsockets|ftp|wp-filesystem-ftpext|pclzip|wp-importer|wp-upgrader|wp-filesystem-base|ftp-sockets|wp-filesystem-direct)\.php/i'
);
// --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
// FINALLY, DO THE SEARCHES, USING THE ABOVE ARRAYS AS THE STRING DATA SOURCES.
// REPORT FILES WITH SUSPICIOUS NAMES
foreach($SuspiciousFileAndPathNames as $i)
find_files($StartPath, $i, 'badnames');
// REPORT FILES WITH SUSPICIOUS PHARMA-RELATED NAMES
foreach($PharmaFilenames as $i)
find_files($StartPath, $i, 'pharma');
// REPORT FILES CONTAINING SUSPICIOUS CODE OR TEXT
foreach($FiletypesToSearch as $i)
find_files($StartPath, $i, 'maliciouscodesnippets');
echo "<br>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>";
echo "<br>Done<br>";
?>
</p>
</body>
</html><?Did this file decode correctly?
Original Code
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NHjyBl28fJYX4gQk2/99/yr8vLVCJ454RX4j//5K/umJRn94VfxBFhr7xdmb/wU='))); Function Calls
| gzinflate | 1 |
| base64_decode | 1 |
Stats
| MD5 | f663e857403805a443ea07b81ca4b251 |
| Eval Count | 1 |
| Decode Time | 112 ms |